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Abstract
This paper studies capital structure adjustment mechanisms of ﬁrms that experience substantial
changes in leverage. Adjustments appear to be asymmetric among ﬁrms with large increases and
those with large decreases in debt ratios. The different adjustments are not due to differences in
leverage targets or industry distributions between the samples. Speeds of adjustment are found to
be affected by market timing opportunities. The persistence of equity market timing opportunities
slows some ﬁrms’ rebalancing process.
JEL classiﬁcation: G32
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; International topics
Résumé
L’auteure examine les mécanismes d’ajustement de la structure du capital des entreprises qui
subissent d’importantes modiﬁcations du levier ﬁnancier. Ces entreprises s’ajustent à des rythmes
différents selon que leur ratio d’endettement augmente ou diminue beaucoup. Cette asymétrie du
rythme d’ajustement ne résulte pas de la présence d’écarts entre les ratios cibles d’endettement ni
de différences dans la composition sectorielle des échantillons. La vitesse de l’ajustement apparaît
plutôt inﬂuencée par les possibilités avantageuses de ﬁnancement sur les marchés boursiers. Dans
certaines entreprises, la persistance de ces possibilités ralentit le rééquilibrage.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G32
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Questions internationalesI. Introduction
Whether ¯rms adjust toward a target leverage level has become an essential question in
evaluating the credibility of competing capital structure theories. The static and dynamic
trade-o® theories predict that ¯rms will quickly revert to their optimal debt ratio whenever
there are deviations in their capital structures. In contrast, the pecking order, market timing,
and inertia theories all include the argument that ¯rms do not have a market-value leverage
target, and therefore they will not adjust quickly toward the optimum.
Previous research di®erentiates between these competing capital structure theories by
estimating ¯rms' speed of adjustment using a partial adjustment model.1 A fast speed of
adjustment is interpreted as a support for the trade-o® theories, while a slow adjustment is
viewed as being consistent with no target capital structure theories. For example, Flannery
and Rangan (2006) ¯nd the speed of adjustment is 34.1% per year and argue that this fast
adjustment is consistent with the dynamic trade-o® theory. Fama and French (2002) show
¯rms adjust at a \snail" pace, which supports the pecking order theory. Huang and Ritter
(2005) interpret the slow speed of adjustment (11.3%) to be consistent with the market
timing theory. A °aw of these studies is that they estimate the speed of adjustment using
all ¯rms contained in the COMPUSTAT database regardless of their actual leverage ratios
relative to their target. They implicitly assume that ¯rms follow a uniform adjustment rule
and the speed of adjustment is symmetric. However, these assumptions are not plausible.
This paper shows that ¯rms do not adopt the same capital structure adjustment mech-
anism. They react di®erently to positive and negative past leverage changes. The speed of
1A partial adjustment model is a dynamic model that estimates how fast ¯rms adjust their leverage
toward the desired level. Detailed description of the model is in Section III.
1adjustment appears to be asymmetric. In addition, ¯rms do not make adjustment when they
are at their optimal debt ratios. They also may not rebalance all the time due to the presence
of adjustment costs. They are less likely to respond to small °uctuations in their leverage ra-
tios. Therefore, estimating the partial adjustment model using all ¯rms, whether they need
to rebalance their capital structures or not, may bias the estimated speed of adjustment,
which may lead to an incorrect rejection of the alternative capital structure theories. This
paper, by contrast, studies the adjustment mechanism of ¯rms that experience substantial
changes in their leverage ratios. This approach takes into account that at or close to their
optimal leverage level, ¯rms may not need to adjust their capital structures.
The closest empirical design to that used in this study is the one that Baker and Wurgler
(2002) employed in their examination of subsequent adjustments to a ¯rm's initial public
o®ering (IPO). Clearly, an IPO leads to an infusion of equity and a signi¯cant downward
adjustment to a ¯rm's debt ratio. However, as Xu (2005) shows, in order for the adjustment
coe±cient to correctly measure the speed of adjustment, one must assume that the optimal
debt ratios of private and public ¯rms are equal. Xu (2005) shows that such an assumption is
implausible, in that while private ¯rms' debt ratios are determined by characteristics similar
to those of public ¯rms, the absolute debt ratio is higher, thus biasing the empirical design
against the static trade-o® model. However, the research design used in this study has the
potential to circumvent such bias.
This paper identi¯es ¯rms having a substantial increase or decrease in their leverage ratios
and then groups them into a positive and a negative sample. Ideally, these signi¯cant changes
are exogenous shocks moving ¯rms away from their optimal debt ratios and the subsequent
adjustment would re°ect the importance of the leverage target. A fast adjustment would
2indicate the ¯rst order importance of the target. However, ex ante, it is hard to determine
whether the leverage changes are shocks away from target or adjustments back to target.
We can only see from the samples, ex post, that positive changes appear to be debt issues
moving ¯rms toward target and negative changes in leverage ratios appear to be equity issues
resulting in a deviation from target. The unpredictability of signi¯cant changes, especially
the negative changes, using logit models indicates \exogeneity" of these changes.2
Firms in both positive and negative samples are found to time the market by issuing
equity at high market values, although the timings are di®erent. However, the subsequent
capital structure adjustments following the equity market timing are di®erent. Firms in
the positive sample quickly adjust back to the leverage target through debt issues and then
maintain the optimum, which is consistent with the trade-o® theories. In contrast, ¯rms in
the negative sample seem to only gradually rebalance away the market timing e®ects. The
di®erence in the adjustments is not due to the di®erential leverage targets of ¯rms in the
two samples. Furthermore, there is no signi¯cant di®erence in the industry distributions of
¯rms in the two samples.
The annual speed of adjustment for ¯rms in the negative sample, estimated from the
partial adjustment model using the system Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM),
is 14%.3 To understand why these ¯rms rebalance slowly, I examine the e®ect of adjustment
2It is hard to identify truly exogenous shocks on capital structure that will not shift the ¯rm's optimal
debt ratio, especially for book leverage ratios. Every ¯nancing decision that a®ects a ¯rm's leverage ratio is
chosen by the ¯rm, which is not exogenous, strictly speaking.
3Hsiao (2003) and Baltagi (2005) show that the usual techniques, such as OLS and ¯xed-e®ects estimates,
give biased estimates for the coe±cients of the partial adjustment model because the lagged leverage ratio,
as an explanatory variable, is correlated with the error term. Speci¯cally, OLS tends to underestimate the
3costs on the speed of adjustment. Adjustment costs are found not to be the main reason
that prevents ¯rms from adjusting quickly toward the leverage target. A further analysis of
these slow-rebalancing ¯rms reveals that some ¯rms keep timing the equity market to take
advantage of their persistently high market values, resulting in an even further deviation from
the target leverage level. For these ¯rms, taking advantage of the \window of opportunity"
o®ered by the high market values is more important than quickly moving back toward the
leverage target. The existence of these persistent equity market timers slows the estimated
speed of adjustment. Failing to recognize that market timing is not a \one shot" deal will bias
the estimate against the trade-o® model. To my knowledge, this paper is the ¯rst to show
empirically that ¯rms adopt di®erent adjustment mechanisms and the speed of adjustment
is a®ected by equity market timing opportunities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses capital structure theories and
their predictions. Section III describes the samples and summary statistics. Section IV
estimates the speed of adjustment from the partial adjustment model. Section V studies
the cumulative adjustment of the capital structure. Section VI presents robustness checks.
Section VII studies factors that a®ect the speed of adjustment, and Section VIII concludes.
II. Capital Structure Theories and Predictions
The existing capital structure theories have di®erent predictions about ¯rms' adjustment
mechanism toward a target leverage level. The static trade-o® theory argues that ¯rm value is
speed of adjustment and the ¯xed-e®ects model tends to overestimate the speed. As Blundell and Bond
(2000), Bond (2002), and Baltagi (2005) suggested, the system GMM provides unbiased estimates for the
AR(1) panel data regression model.
4maximized at an optimal debt ratio, which is based on the trade-o® between tax bene¯ts and
the expected bankruptcy costs of debt. When shocks cause deviations from this optimum,
¯rms will quickly rebalance toward the target. In a frictionless world, the adjustment will
be immediate and complete.
However, the adjustment will be incomplete in the presence of adjustment costs. The
dynamic trade-o® theory suggests that adjustment costs preclude the ¯rm from adjusting its
leverage ratio frequently.4 The ¯rm must trade o® these adjustment costs against the costs of
operating with a suboptimal capital structure (deviation costs). The ¯rm will readjust when
the deviation costs outweigh the adjustment costs. Since ¯rms value the leverage target in
a trade-o® world, deviations from the target leverage are usually temporary, and the speed
of adjustment is relatively fast.
In contrast, the adjustment in response to a shock will be slow when ¯rms are indi®erent
about leverage ratios. The pecking order, market timing, and inertia theories all predict
that ¯rms will not quickly rebalance away the e®ect of leverage shocks because there is no
target leverage ratio. Myers and Majluf (1984)'s pecking order theory argues that ¯rms
¯nance themselves in the order of internal funds, debt, and equity. Equity issues occur only
as a last resort because of the adverse selection costs that arise as a result of information
asymmetries between managers and investors. Consequently, the debt ratio becomes an
\accident", resulting from internal cash °ows and investment needs. Baker and Wurgler
(2002)'s market timing theory claims that ¯rms issue equity when they are overvalued, and
4See Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Strebulaev (2004), Hennessy and Whited (2005), and Leary
and Roberts (2005). Note that the original Modigliani and Miller (1958) model explicitly assumes perfect
capital markets; otherwise their homemade leverage argument will not arbitrage capital structure di®erences
across ¯rms.
5capital structures are then a cumulative outcome of their market timing behaviour. As a
result, the debt ratio is simply an \accident" of market timing. From a di®erent perspective,
Welch (2004)'s inertia theory states that managers do not respond to stock return changes,
so that most of the variation in market value debt ratios can be explained by past return
°uctuations. Consequently, all of these three theories imply a slow or non-existent speed of
adjustment.
Hence, the speed of adjustment is essential to di®erentiate among the competing capi-
tal structure theories. However, there is no consensus in the literature about the speed of
adjustment. For example, Fama and French (2002), and Huang and Ritter (2005) suggest
that ¯rms slowly adjust toward their leverage target, while Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and
Flannery and Rangan (2006) suggest a fast adjustment. The discrepancy in the estimated
speeds of adjustment between these empirical tests has di®erent implications for the deter-
minants of capital structure. A slow adjustment indicates that past ¯nancing activities play
a role in determining the current capital structure. It suggests that either ¯rms do not have
a leverage target or achieving the target is not of prime importance. By contrast, quick
adjustment implies that history has no role and that the trade-o®s between the costs and
bene¯ts associated with ¯nancial policies will determine the optimal capital structure.
To study the importance of target leverage ratio, this paper identi¯es ¯rms experiencing
signi¯cant changes in leverage to see how fast they readjust. This approach has the potential
to avoid averaging the asymmetric speeds of adjustment. The selected ¯rms are not IPO
issuers in order to avoid creating potential bias against the trade-o® theory in empirical
design.
6III. The Samples
A. Data and Summary Statistics
The data used in this study are from COMPUSTAT. The sample contains ¯rms appearing
in COMPUSTAT between January 1, 1970 and December 31, 2004. Utility (SIC 4900-4999)
and ¯nancial (SIC 6000-6999) ¯rms, ¯rms involved in major mergers (COMPUSTAT footnote
code AB), and ¯rms that reported format codes 4, 5, or 6 are excluded from the sample, as
are ¯rms with a book value of total assets less than $10 million.
The ¯nal samples are formed by identifying ¯rms that experience substantial (more than
20%) changes in both book and market leverage ratios.5 Firms with a signi¯cant decrease in
leverage are grouped in the negative sample, and those with a signi¯cant increase comprise
the positive sample.6 Table I presents summary statistics for the ¯rm characteristics and
¯nancing decisions of the negative and positive samples. Year 0 is the event year when the
leverage shocks happen. Year -1 is one year prior, and Years 1 to 5 are the subsequent ¯scal
years.7 The variables de¯ning ¯rm characteristics are listed in Appendix A. Since values for
5Firms are required not to have substantial changes in book and market leverage one year prior. Alter-
native cuto® points (e.g., 10% and 30%) are also tested. The results are similar. Also, a restriction that
¯rms with a minimum 5% pre-event year leverage does not change the results.
6If a ¯rm appears in the negative sample, then it is not allowed to be in the positive sample during the
study period. However, allowing the ¯rm appear in both samples during the study period does not a®ect
the results.
7The results may be subject to survivorship bias, since the samples contain ¯rms with 7 years of consec-
utive data. However, samples having ¯rms with 5 years of consecutive data (from Year -1 to Year 3) yield
similar results. The survivorship bias may not be very important in this study.
7¯rm-year observations are often ratios and skewed, extreme outliers are deleted.8
Table I shows that the positive change in leverage is mainly due to debt issues and the
negative change is a result of equity issue and debt retirement. The most striking observation
from the summary statistics is that ¯rms with signi¯cantly negative and positive changes in
leverage do not exhibit the same rebalancing behaviour. Firms in both the negative and the
positive samples issue equity at a high market-to-book ratio and high stock return, although
the timings of equity issues are di®erent: ¯rms in the negative sample time the market in
Year 0, while those in the positive sample do it in Year -1. These ¯rms use the money raised
to retire a substantial amount of debt. As a result of both the equity issues and the debt
retirement, ¯rms in the negative and the positive samples have low average book leverage
ratios of 19.93% and 20.55%, respectively. However, the subsequent adjustments following
market timing equity issues are di®erent. Firms in the negative sample adjust slowly back
to the long-run mean or, loosely speaking, their target debt ratio, while ¯rms in the positive
sample use the debt issue to reach the target quickly. Firms in the negative sample retrace
53% of the way back to their starting debt ratio in Year 5.9 The debt issues of ¯rms in the
positive sample in Year 0 raise their average book leverage ratio substantially from 20.55%
to 33.90%. This increase in their debt ratio moves these ¯rms to a desired leverage level,
and they do not make any subsequent adjustment to their capital structures. The observed
di®erence in the adjustment mechanisms adopted by ¯rms in the two samples indicates that
the speed of adjustment is asymmetric.
Figure 1 Panel A visually shows the di®erent adjustment patterns observed in the two
8Observations outside the 1st and 99th percentiles are deleted to avoid the in°uence of outliers.
9The book leverage drops from 32.69% to 19.93% in Year 0 and then increases to 26.73% in Year 5. The
deviation is closed by (26.73-19.93)/(32.69-19.93)=53% within 5 years.
8samples. Both the book leverage ratio and the market leverage ratio exhibit the same
rebalancing pattern. Firms in the negative sample appear to o®set the shock and increase
their debt ratios gradually over time, while ¯rms in the positive sample appear to move fast
to the optimum and then try to maintain the ratio for several years. Panel B presents the
leverage adjustments of 5-year before and 5-year after the signi¯cant changes. Note that this
¯gure only includes ¯rms that have 11 years of consecutive data, which may not be the best
representative of ¯rms in the sample.10 The ¯gure shows that the debt ratio of ¯rms in the
negative sample increases slightly (from 32% to 36%) from 5-year to 1-year before the large
decreases in leverage and then adjusts gradually to the long-run mean leverage ratio, while
that of ¯rms in the positive sample decrease gradually until they reach the \boundary" in
the pre-event year (from 30% to 21%) and they make a one step adjustment back to the
target and then they just maintain the optimal ratio in the subsequent 5 years. Then, the
question is: what causes the observed di®erence in adjustment?
B. The Industry Distributions
A potential reason for the observed di®erence in adjustment could be because ¯rms in
the two samples come from di®erent industries and the adjustment di®erence simply re°ects
industry di®erence. To explore this possibility, the percentage of ¯rms in each industry
is graphed in Figure 2. As shown, ¯rms in the two samples are basically from the same
industries, although some industries have more ¯rms with large changes in debt ratios than
other industries. For example, 10.06% (9.11%) of ¯rms in the positive (negative) sample
10Figure 1 Panel B represents 368 (27%) ¯rms in the positive sample and 572 (33%)¯rms in the negative
sample.
9are from Industrial Machinery and Equipment industry, and 1.19% (1.03%) of ¯rms in the
positive (negative) sample are from Health Service industry. There is no signi¯cant di®erence
in the industry distributions of ¯rms in the two samples. Industry di®erence does not explain
the observed adjustment di®erence.
C. The Optimal Leverage Ratios
Another possible reason for the di®erence in adjustment behaviour could be that ¯rms in
the negative and positive samples have di®erent optimal debt ratios, leading them to make
di®erent adjustments. To test this hypothesis, I ¯rst estimate the leverage determinant
regression model using ¯rms in the full sample.11
















where Lt is the leverage ratio at time t; market-to-book ratio, operating pro¯tability, size,
and tangibility are the previous period ¯rm characteristic variables that have been identi¯ed
as the major determinants of capital structure by prior research (Rajan and Zingales (1995),
Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-kunt, and Maksimovic (2001)).
In the second step, the means of the ¯rm characteristics from the summary statistics are
plugged into the estimated model, which enables us to obtain the predicted optimal leverage
ratios. Table II presents the year-by-year predicted optimal book debt ratios for ¯rms in
the negative and positive samples. The optimal debt ratios of ¯rms in the two samples
appear to be similar and stable over time, around 33%. However, the actual leverage ratio
11The sample contains both ¯rms that make substantial leverage changes and those that do not. Ad-
ditionally, using only ¯rms with substantial changes in leverage to estimate the model do not change the
results.
10are signi¯cantly di®erent between ¯rms in the two samples. The similarity of optimal debt
ratios indicates the di®erence in the observed adjustment mechanisms followed by ¯rms in
the two samples is not driven by the di®erence in their target leverage ratios.
D. Prediction of Signi¯cant Changes in Leverage
The summary statistics show that ¯rms in the positive and negative samples exhibit
di®erent adjustment patterns. An interesting question is whether we can predict the types
of ¯rms more likely to increase or decrease their leverage by more than 20%. Two separate
logit models are estimated to answer this question.
Pr(y = 1) =
1
1 + e®+¯X: (2)
where y = 1 if a ¯rm increases its debt ratio by more than 20%, y = 0 if the change in debt
ratio is less than 20% but more than -20%; and y = 1 if a ¯rm decreases its debt ratio by
more than 20%, y = 0 if the change in debt ratio is more than -20% but less than 20%; and
X are pre-event year ¯rm characteristic variables, including the debt ratio, the market-to-
book ratio, operating pro¯tability, size, tangibility, investment, research and development
expenditures, and the cash rate.12
Table III shows that the impact of the explanatory variables are generally statistically
signi¯cant. However, the odds ratios of most explanatory variables are very close to one,
indicating the probabilities of an increase (decrease) and no change in leverage ratio are
almost equal. The relationship between the ¯rm characteristic variables and the probability
of a signi¯cant change in leverage is very weak. The relatively low pseudo R2s also suggest
a low predictability of substantial changes in leverage using the ¯rm characteristic variables.
12The cash tax rate is excluded because it is highly correlated with EBITDA (0.61).
11The pseudo R2 is especially low when predicting the negative changes. The unpredictability
of substantial decreases in leverage implies that the negative leverage shock is likely to be
\exogenous".
IV. Speed of Adjustment
A. The Partial Adjustment Model
Table I shows that ¯rms in the leverage decreasing sample rebalance their capital struc-
tures gradually after the shock. The question is: how fast do these ¯rms adjust? The
analysis focuses on negative sample because ¯rms in the positive sample have reached their
optimal debt ratios and do not make subsequent adjustments and also the negative change
in leverage is more \exogenous".
The speed of adjustment is still an unsettled issue in the literature (Frank and Goyal
(2007)). The speed of adjustment can be estimated using a standard partial adjustment
model:
Lit ¡ Lit¡1 = ®(L
¤
it ¡ Lit¡1): (3)
where Lit is the leverage ratio of ¯rm i at year t, and L¤
it is ¯rm i's target leverage; ® measures
how the change in leverage is a®ected by deviations of the observed leverage ratio from the
target. The partial adjustment model can be used to test whether ¯rms have a long-run
target leverage ratio and to estimate the speed at which the observed leverage ratio adjusts
toward the target.
12Alternatively, the adjustment model of equation (3) can be written as
Lit = (1 ¡ ®)Lit¡1 + ®L
¤
it: (4)
showing that the observed leverage ratio at time t is a weighted average of the optimal and
lagged leverage ratios with ® and (1 ¡ ®) as weights, respectively.
Unfortunately, the target leverage ratio is unobservable. The most commonly used proxy
is the prediction from the beginning-of-period ¯rm characteristics of the form:
L
¤
it = ° + ¯Xit¡1 + (´t + ui + vit): (5)
where Xit¡1 is a vector of ¯rm characteristics that determine a ¯rm's leverage ratio, ´t is
time series e®ects, ui captures individual ¯rm e®ects, and vit is the disturbance term. With
the above speci¯cation, the target debt ratio may vary both across ¯rms and over time
(Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Huang and Ritter (2005)). The
reduced form partial adjustment model is then:
Lit = (1 ¡ ®)Lit¡1 + ®¯Xit¡1 + ®° + ²it (6)
²it = ®(´t + ui + vit)
In this model, ® measures the speed of adjustment toward the target; 0 < ® < 1 would
indicate a partial adjustment; ® = 0 would imply no adjustment, and ® = 1 would indicate
a complete adjustment.
B. Estimation Methods
There are several ways to estimate the speed of adjustment. For example, Shyam-Sunder
and Myers (1999) use OLS, while Flannery and Rangan (2006) control for ¯rm ¯xed e®ects
13when estimating the partial adjustment model. However, note that in the reduced form
partial adjustment model of equation (6), the lagged dependent variable Lit¡1 is an explana-
tory variable. Since a ¯rm's leverage Lit¡1 is a function of the individual ¯rm e®ects ui, the
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term ®(´t + ui + vit).13 As a result,
the OLS estimate of (1 ¡ ®) will be biased. Speci¯cally, the coe±cient on Lit¡1 tends to be
overestimated.14 Thus, the speed of adjustment ® will be underestimated.
The ¯xed-e®ects estimator is also biased. The ¯xed-e®ects estimator uses a within-¯rm
transformation to wipe out the individual ¯rm e®ects ui. Speci¯cally, the observations are
expressed as deviations from their corresponding individual ¯rm means, and then OLS is
applied to the transformed data. Although this de-mean transformation removes individual
¯rm e®ects, it induces a non-negligible correlation between the transformed lagged dependent




Lit¡1)=(T ¡ 1), is still correlated with vit ¡ vit, where vit = (
T P
t=2
vit)=(T ¡ 1), even if
the vit are not serially correlated. The correlation is because Lit¡1 is correlated with vit by
construction. The correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the
transformed error term is shown to be negative and does not disappear as the number of ¯rms
increases (Nickell (1981)). Thus, the ¯xed-e®ects estimate for (1 ¡ ®) tends to be seriously
biased downwards, especially for the short time dimension.15 The speed of adjustment is
13Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2005) show the unobserved ¯rm speci¯c e®ects explain major variation
in capital structure.
14See Hsiao (2003) for the derivation of the bias in the OLS estimator.
15Judson and Owen (1999) show that even for T = 30, this bias could be as much as 20% of the true value
of the coe±cient of interest. This bias increases with the value of the coe±cient on the lagged dependent
variable and deceases with T. Bond (2002) shows that the bias of the ¯xed e®ects estimator can be very
severe. A true coe±cient of 0.5 can become almost zero when N=500 and T=4.
14then overestimated.
Since both the OLS and the ¯xed-e®ects estimators are biased for the AR(1) panel data
model, Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a \di®erenced GMM" estimator.16 They ¯rst
di®erence the equations to eliminate the individual ¯rm e®ects, which solves the problem
of having correlations between some regressors (e.g., Lit¡1) and the individual ¯rm e®ects
(ui), and they then use lagged levels of the series (e.g., Lit¡2, Lit¡3, ¢¢¢) as instruments
for the di®erenced predetermined or endogenous variables (e.g., ¢Lit¡1 = Lit¡1 ¡ Lit¡2),
which solves the problem of having correlation between the di®erenced regressors and the
di®erenced disturbance. A critical assumption of the di®erenced GMM estimator is that
the disturbances vit in the levels equations are not serially correlated, which can be tested
by testing for negative ¯rst-order correlation and zero second-order correlation in the ¯rst-
di®erenced residuals. An advantage of the GMM over other techniques is that it can control
for both individual heterogeneity and potential endogeneity issues.
However, the lagged levels are often weak instruments for the ¯rst di®erence variables
when a series is highly persistent. Particularly, the Arellano-Bond estimator is subject to
serious ¯nite sample biases when Lit is highly persistent and the number of time series ob-
servations is moderately small. The estimate of the coe±cient on Lit¡1 will be severely
biased downwards when the coe±cient is large because the correlation between ¢Lit¡1 and
Lit¡2;Lit¡3;¢¢¢ drops as the coe±cient approaches 1.17 Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) develop a \the system GMM" estimator, which adds the levels equations
16Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) show that one important feature of the partial adjustment model is
that it can be rewritten in many di®erent ways without changing the least squares parameter estimates. The
GMM provides consistent estimators for the AR(1) regression model.
17See Blundell and Bond (2000) and Ahn and Schmidt (1995), for example.
15and the additional moment conditions to the di®erenced equations. The system GMM uses
the contemporaneous ¯rst di®erences (¢Lit¡1) of the dependent variables as instruments for
equations in the levels and all available lags of variables in the levels (Lit¡2;Lit¡3;¢¢¢) as
instruments for equations in ¯rst di®erences.18 The system GMM has been shown to have
a much smaller ¯nite sample bias and more e±ciency than the di®erenced GMM because it
uses the extra information from the untransformed model.19
C. Results
Table IV presents the estimation results of the partial adjustment model, equation (6),
using OLS, the ¯xed-e®ects panel estimate, the di®erenced GMM, and the system-GMM.20
Firm characteristic variables include the market-to-book ratio, operating pro¯tability, size,
and tangibility. The GMM results are one-step GMM estimates, with heteroskedasticity-
consistent asymptotic standard errors.21 The ¯rm characteristic variables are assumed to be
predetermined.
Table IV reports the estimates of the speed of adjustment for ¯rms in the negative sample.
As expected, in the presence of ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects, OLS appears to give an upward-biased
estimate of the coe±cient on Lit¡1 (1 ¡ ® = 0:89), while the ¯xed-e®ects estimate appears
18Appendix B shows the moment conditions for the system GMM estimators.
19Bond (2002) provides a good review of these estimators.
20The data starting from year 0 are used to estimate the speed of adjustment after the event. The estimates
of constant and year dummies are not presented in the table.
21Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend using the one-step GMM results for inference on coe±cients. The
two-step standard errors tend to be biased downward in small samples. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that
inferences based on the one-step GMM asymptotic variance matrix are more reliable than the asymptotically,
more-e±cient, two-step estimator.
16to be biased downwards (1 ¡ ® = 0:43). The gap between the OLS and the ¯xed-e®ects
estimates, which are biased in opposite directions, is large. The di®erenced GMM estimate
of (1¡®) (=0.41) is also biased towards zero, suggesting the possibility of serious ¯nite sample
bias.22 The system GMM estimate, which corrects for the ¯nite sample bias, is between the
OLS and the ¯xed-e®ects estimates. The test statistics (m1 and m2) show that there is
a ¯rst-order serial correlation and no second-order autocorrelation in the ¯rst-di®erenced
residuals, which satis¯es the essential assumption for the GMM of no serial correlation in
the disturbances vit. The Sargan-Hansen test also reveals that the instruments used in the
GMM estimation are valid.
The system GMM estimate of the speed of adjustment is 14% (1¡® = 0:86) per year for
book leverage, implying that about 14% of the discrepancy between the desired and actual
leverage levels is eliminated within a year.23 Assuming a constant speed of adjustment, it
indicates that ¯rms will adjust about half of the deviation caused by the shock within 5
years, which is consistent with the pattern observed in the summary statistics. This speed
of adjustment is much slower than that estimated by Flannery and Rangan (2006) (34.1%
per year). Flannery and Rangan use lagged book leverage as instruments for lagged market
leverage to address the bias caused by the correlation between a panel's lagged dependent
variable and the error term. As Huang and Ritter (2005) point out, lagged book leverage
may not be a valid instrument for lagged market leverage because both are likely to be
a®ected by the same shocks. Huang and Ritter (2005) also ¯nd a slow speed of adjustment
22The numbers in parentheses are the coe±cients for the book leverage ratios.
23Although system GMM estimate is close to OLS estimate for this capital structure partial adjustment
model, it is not always the case for any dynamic panel data model.
17using transformed maximum-likelihood and minimum-distance estimators.24
V. The Cumulative Adjustment Model
The partial adjustment model, equation (6), estimates the annual speed of adjustment,
assuming a constant annual adjustment. In reality, ¯rms may not make adjustments every
year and the speed of adjustment may be di®erent each year. A cumulative adjustment model
can estimate the extent to which the leverage changes from the event year are explained by
deviations of the event year leverage ratio from the target.
Lit ¡ Li0 = ®(L
¤
it ¡ Li0): (7)
where Lit is the leverage ratio of ¯rm i at year t, Li0 is the leverage ratio of ¯rm i at event
year 0, and L¤
it is ¯rm i's target leverage; ® measures the cumulative speed of adjustment
since the event year.
The reduced-form, cumulative adjustment model is then:




Lit = (1 ¡ ®)Li0 + ®¯Xit¡1 + ®° + ²it (9)
²it = ®(´t + ui + vit)
where ´t is time series e®ects, ui captures individual ¯rm e®ects, and vit is disturbance.
24A drawback of the maximum-likelihood approach is that the estimates heavily rely on the assumptions
made about the distribution of the initial conditions. Di®erent assumptions about the initial conditions will
lead to di®erent likelihood functions and possible inconsistent maximum-likelihood estimators if the initial
conditions are misspeci¯ed. GMM estimates avoid this shortcoming.
18Table V presents the estimates of the cumulative speed of adjustment for ¯rms in the
negative sample. The OLS estimators are used because the lagged di®erenced leverage and
the previous lagged leverage levels that the system GMM estimators require as instruments
are not available. The OLS estimators could be reasonable approximations for the GMM
estimates because the OLS estimates are very close to the system GMM estimates, as shown
in Table IV. Table V indicates that ¯rms adjust at a speed of 16% for the book leverage ratio
one year after a signi¯cant drop in leverage. In subsequent years, the speed of adjustment
slows down. Firms adjust by 38% of the deviation in 5 years.
VI. Robustness
A. Alternative Target Proxies
In equation (6), the leverage target is predicted by ¯rm characteristic variables. Since
the trade-o® theory does not explicitly specify the target leverage ratio, researchers have
disagreed about what is a good proxy for the target. Commonly used proxies include the
industry median debt ratio as in Hovakimian (2004); the ¯tted values from the estimates of
equation (5), and the historical 3-year average of leverage for each ¯rm as in Marsh (1982)
and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). In Table VI regression (1), the industry median debt
ratio is used as a proxy for the leverage target to estimate equation (4).25 In regression
(2), a two-step procedure is used. In the ¯rst step, the ¯tted leverage value is estimated
from equation (5) and in the second step, the ¯tted value is used as a proxy for the leverage
25An industry is de¯ned as ¯rm with the same two-digit SIC code.
19target.26 Both regressions (1) and (2) are estimated using the system GMM.
Table VI shows that with di®erent speci¯cations of the target, the estimated speed of
adjustment for ¯rms in the leverage-decreasing sample is still relatively slow. The adjustment
speed is between 15% and 18%. The results also show that both the industry median leverage
ratio and the ¯tted values a®ect the current debt ratio signi¯cantly, suggesting that the
leverage target a®ects ¯rms' current capital structures. The signi¯cance of the leverage
target and the slow speed of adjustment indicate that while most ¯rms have a leverage
target, moving back to the target appears to be not of primary importance. This result is
consistent with Graham and Harvey (2001)'s survey ¯ndings that many ¯rms claim to have
a leverage target, but achieving the target is not their major concern.
B. Di®erent Leverage Measures
In the literature, leverage has been de¯ned in many ways. Table VII re-estimates equa-
tion (6) using three alternative leverage measures. In regression (1), book debt is de¯ned as
current liabilities (COMPUSTAT Annual Item 34) plus long-term debt (Item 9) minus mar-
ketable securities (Item 238).27 Book equity is stockholders' equity (Item 216) plus minority
interest (Item 38). In regression (2), leverage is de¯ned as current liabilities plus long-term
debt divided by total assets. In regression (3), book debt is de¯ned as liabilities (Item 181)
26The estimation that uses the historical 3-year average of leverage as a proxy for the leverage target is
not reported because this variable includes Lt¡1, which will causes collinearity between the independent
variables. Bearing this bias in mind, the estimated speed of adjustment is also slow.
27Marketable securities are deducted because they are applied against debt. This measure gives an overall
impression of a ¯rm's debt situation and is commonly used by investment bankers. Cash is not subtracted
because it is needed during the normal course of business.
20plus preferred stock (Item 10 or Item 56 if Item 10 is missing) minus deferred taxes (Item
35) and convertible debt (Item 79). Book equity is total assets (Item 6) minus book debt.
Market leverage is the ratio of corresponding book debt to the market value of assets (Item
25 times Item 199 plus book debt).28
The estimated speed of adjustment is still relatively slow (16-19% for book leverage and
14-15% for market leverage) using three alternative leverage measures. Using these leverage
measures, ¯rms adjust relatively faster toward the book leverage ratio than toward the
market leverage ratio, which is consistent with the fact that the book-based target is the
ratio to which ¯rms adhere.29
VII. Determinants of the Speed of Adjustment
A. Adjustment Costs
Firms in the negative sample are found to have a slow speed of adjustment. This section
examines why these ¯rms revert slowly to the target leverage level. Adjustment costs could be
a factor a®ecting the speed of adjustment.30 It may be costly for ¯rms to adjust their capital
structures because of transaction costs. Firms with low adjustment costs should adjust more
28The di®erence in the number of observations occurs because of the di®erence in the number of ¯rms that
are identi¯ed as experiencing a signi¯cant decrease in their leverage ratios using di®erent leverage measures.
29Graham and Harvey (2001) states that most practitioners do not strictly adhere to market-based debt
targets, which would require costly, frequent re-balancings because the market values of debt and equity
°uctuate daily.
30Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996) report that for U.S. ¯rms from 1990 to 1994, the average direct
costs of IPOs are 11% of the proceeds and those of seasoned equity o®erings (SEOs) are 7.1%. The average
direct costs of straight debt issues are 2.2%, which is much smaller than those of equity issues.
21quickly. Large ¯rms generally have better access to both debt and equity markets and su®er
lower asymmetric information costs because of more publicly available information. Large
¯rms, therefore, are expected to have relatively lower transaction costs and adjust relatively
faster toward their leverage target than their small counterparts.
Shelf registration (Securities Exchange Commission Rule 415) allows ¯rms to ¯le a master
registration statement of new issues two years in advance, which gives ¯rms an opportunity
to sell the registered issues quickly in favorable market conditions.31 With a registration on
the shelf, ¯rms only need to ¯le short statements when they want to sell any of the approved
securities during the period. Bhagat, Marr, and Thompson (1985) and Blackwell, Marr,
and Spivey (1990) found that issuers pay lower underwriting fees by using shelf registration.
Therefore, shelf issuers are expected to adjust relatively faster because of lower adjustment
costs.
To test whether large and small ¯rms and ¯rms with and without shelf-registration have
di®erent speeds of adjustment, the following model is estimated:
Lit ¡ Lit¡1 = ®1(L
¤
it ¡ Lit¡1) + ®2(L
¤
it ¡ Lit¡1)D: (10)
where D is the dummy variable which is 1 for large ¯rms and 0 for small ¯rms in regression
(1) and is 1 for shelf issuers and 0 for non-shelf issuers in regression (2). The di®erential
slope coe±cient, ®2, captures the potential di®erence in the speeds of adjustment for ¯rms
with di®erent adjustment costs. Substituting equation (5) yields the reduced-form model:
Lit = (1 ¡ ®1)Lit¡1 ¡ ®2Lit¡1 £ D + ®1¯Xit¡1 + ®2¯Xit¡1 £ D
+®1° + ®2° £ D + ²it (11)
31The securities could be common stocks, debt, or preferred stocks. Firms with a shelf registration can
issue securities more easily, and they normally renew the registration all the time.
22²it = ®1(´t + ui + vit) + ®2(´t + ui + vit) £ D:
Table VIII regression (1) reports the impact of ¯rm size on the speed of adjustment.32
The di®erential slope coe±cients are insigni¯cant, implying that large ¯rms do not appear
to adjust at a signi¯cantly di®erent speed than small ¯rms. Welch (2004) also shows that
large ¯rms are no more likely to readjust their debt ratios than small ¯rms.
Table VIII regression (2) compares the speeds of adjustment for shelf and non-shelf
issuers.33 In terms of book leverage ratio, ¯rms with shelf-registration adjust 9% faster than
¯rms without shelf-registration. In terms of market leverage ratio, the speed of adjustment
for shelf issuers is found to be insigni¯cantly di®erent from that for non-shelf issuers.
Overall, the low signi¯cant levels of the di®erential slope coe±cients imply that recapi-
talization costs are not the main factor that impedes an immediate adjustment toward the
leverage target, which challenges the adjustment costs based explanations.34 The observed
slow speed of adjustment is not caused by the dominance of ¯rms with high transaction costs
32Firms with logarithm of total assets bigger than the median are de¯ned as large ¯rms, otherwise they are
small ¯rms. Large ¯rms could also be de¯ned as ¯rms with logarithm of net sales bigger than the median.
The results are robust to this alternative measure. The coe±cients on Xit¡1£D, time dummy, and constant
are not reported in the table.
33Shelf registration data are from Securities Data Company (SDC) database. It includes shelf registration
for common stocks, debt and preferred stocks. However, shelf registration data is only available since 1982
when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ¯rst introduced it. This lack of data could possibly
bias the estimates. However, Hansen (1986) and Denis (1993) suggest that shelf issuers have lower borrowing
costs regardless of the registration method used because it is ¯rm characteristics determine the lower costs.
Therefore, using shelf registration indicates that a particular ¯rm has lower adjustment costs.
34Graham and Harvey (2001) ¯nd that chief ¯nancial o±cers do not care much about transaction costs.
Few of them would delay debt issuance or retirement simply because of such costs.
23in the negative sample.
B. Firm Characteristics
Firm characteristics also could determine rebalancing behaviour. Among ¯rms that expe-
rience more than a 20% decrease in leverage, some may have di®erent speeds of adjustment
due to their ¯rm characteristics. That is, some may revert to the target debt ratio more
quickly than others. To examine this, for each year following the negative leverage shock,
¯rms in the slow-adjusting sample are ranked according to the changes in their book leverage
ratio and assigned to a quintile; the 5-year averages of ¯rm characteristics in each quintile are
reported in Table IX. The ¯rst quintile consists of ¯rms that greatly reduce their leverage
ratios, and the ¯fth quintile has those that greatly increase their leverage ratios.
An interesting ¯nding is that ¯rms in the ¯rst quintile are noticeably \overvalued" so
that they keep timing the equity market, resulting in a decline in their already very low
level of debt. Instead of trying to move back to the target leverage level, these ¯rms further
reduce their book leverage ratios to an average of 9.35% and their market leverage ratios
to an average of 7.19%. These ¯rms have the highest market-to-book ratio, the highest
stock return, the highest pro¯tability, the most cash, the highest R&D, the highest Z-score,
and the highest cash tax rate. They are the smallest ¯rms and pay the lowest dividends.
In comparison, ¯rms in the fourth and ¯fth quintiles do issue debt to adjust toward the
target. These ¯rms are relatively larger, less pro¯table, and have lower market-to-book
ratio. Moreover, ¯rms in the third quintile make the smallest changes in their leverage ratios
because they are already close to the long-run mean leverage level. They are the largest
¯rms with the lowest market-to-book ratio and R&D.
24This analysis of ¯rms in the slow-rebalancing sample reveals that some ¯rms' market
values are persistently high enough that they keep taking advantage of the \window of op-
portunity" o®ered by a high market-to-book ratio, so they deviate even further away from
the target leverage ratio. The opportunistic behaviour of market timing is not a \one shot"
deal.35 For these ¯rms, market-timing opportunities are more important than moving back
toward the leverage target. For ¯rms that do not have persistent market timing opportuni-
ties, they do adjust quickly toward the target. However, the existence of persistent equity
market timers slows the overall estimated speed of adjustment in the sample.
VIII. Conclusions
This paper ¯nds that adjustments of ¯rms experiencing substantial increases and those
with decreases in leverage ratios are asymmetric. The positive changes appear to be debt
issues that move ¯rms with a below optimal leverage ratio back to their target. After reaching
their optimum, these ¯rms just try to maintain the ratio. This adjustment is consistent with
the prediction of the trade-o® theories. The negative changes appear to be market timing
equity issues that move ¯rms away from their target. Subsequently, these ¯rms exhibit slow
rebalancing behaviour.
The asymmetric adjustments are not because these ¯rms have di®erent leverage targets;
not because they are from di®erent industries. Adjustment costs are also not the main
35For example, Financial Post (2004) reported that Research in Motion Ltd., the maker of BlackBerry
wireless email device, raised US$153.8 million shares in October of 1999 and issued another US$612 million
equity at US$102 just one year later. RIM's stock price rose from US$8.88 in February 1999 to above US$100
in October 2000.
25reason for a slow adjustment. It is the presence of \window of opportunity" o®ered by their
persistently high market values that delay some ¯rms' rebalancing process. A noteworthy
fact is that the opportunistic behaviour of market timing is not a \one shot" deal and failing











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table II: Compare Predicted Optimal Book Debt Ratios in the Negative
and Positive Samples
This table compares the predicted optimal book debt ratios and the ¯rms actual book debt ratios in the
negative and positive samples. The optimal debt ratio is predicted using a two step procedure. In the
¯rst step, the leverage determinant regression model is estimated using the full sample.



















where Lt is leverage ratio at time t; market-to-book ratio, operating pro¯tability, size, and tangibility
are previous period ¯rm characteristic variables. In the second step, the means of ¯rm characteristics in
the negative and positive sample from the summary statistics are plugged into the estimated model to
predict the optimal debt ratios year by year. The actual debt ratios are from the summary statistics.
Negative Positive
Year Predicted L¤ Actual L Predicted L¤ Actual L
-1 | 32.69 | 20.55
0 33.61 19.93 31.75 33.90
1 31.32 21.60 35.10 35.41
2 32.31 23.51 35.95 36.01
3 33.39 25.09 36.36 35.93
4 34.20 26.08 36.57 35.73
5 34.56 26.73 36.77 36.06
29Table III: Prediction of Signi¯cant Change in Leverage using Logit Model
This table reports results of prediction of signi¯cant changes in leverage by estimating two logit models.
Pr(y = 1) =
1
1 + e®+¯X :
where y = 1 if a ¯rm increases its debt ratio by more than 20%, y = 0 if the change in debt ratio is less
than 20% but more than -20%; and y = 1 if a ¯rm decreases its debt ratio by more than 20%, y = 0 if
the change in debt ratio is more than -20% but less than 20%; and X are pre-event year ¯rm characteristic
variables. The odds ratios are reported. Book leverage L is book debt divided by invested capital. Book debt
is de¯ned as current liabilities (COMPUSTAT Annual Item 34) plus long-term debt (Item 9). Book equity
is stockholders' equity (Item 216) plus minority interest (Item 38). Book debt plus book equity is de¯ned as
invested capital. Market-to-book ratio M=B is de¯ned as book debt plus market equity (Item 25£Item 199)
divided by total assets. EBITDA=A is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item 13) divided
by total assets (Item 6). log(S) is the logarithm of net sales (Item 12). PPE=A denotes net property, plant
and equipment (Item 8) divided by total assets. R&D is research and development expenditure (Item 46,
replaced by zero if missing). INV=PPE is capital expenditures (Item 128) normalized by net property,
plant and equipment. CASH=A is de¯ned as cash and short-term investments (Item 1) divided by total
assets. Y EAR dummy controls for macroeconomic conditions. INDUSTRY dummy controls for industry


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table VI: Di®erent Proxies for The Target Leverage
This table estimates the speed of adjustment with di®erent proxies for the target leverage using the
system GMM.
Lit = (1 ¡ ®)Lit¡1 + ®L¤
it
Book leverage is net book debt divided by invested capital. Net book debt is de¯ned as debt in current
liabilities (COMPUSTAT Annual Item 34) plus long-term debt (Item 9). Book equity is stockholders'
equity (Item 216) plus minority interest (Item 38). Net book debt plus book equity is de¯ned as invested
capital. Market leverage is the ratio of book debt to market value of assets (Item 25£Item 199 plus
book debt). Lind is industry median leverage. Lfitted is the ¯tted value from estimates of equation (5).
Lind is assumed to be exogenous since the industry median leverage is likely not a®ected directly by
shocks a®ecting individual ¯rms. Lfitted is assumed to be predetermined since it is a®ected by previous
individual ¯rm shocks. Market-to-book ratio is de¯ned as net book debt plus market equity divided by
total assets. EBITDA=A is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item 13) divided by total
assets. log(S) is logarithm of net sales (Item 12). PPE=A denotes net property, plant and equipment
(Item 8) divided by total assets. The estimates of constant and year dummies are not reported. Absolute
value of t-statistics are in bracket. Absolute value of t-statistics are in bracket. ¤¤ or ¤ indicate signi¯cance
at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Book Leverage Market Leverage
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Lt¡1 0.82** 0.84** 0.85** 0.82**





N 8725 8725 8725 8725
m1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 0.35 0.45 0.58 0.74






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table VIII: Partial Adjustment with Adjustment Costs
This table reports results of partial adjustment model using di®erent proxies for adjustment costs.
Lit = (1 ¡ ®1)Lit¡1 ¡ ®2Lit¡1 £ D + ®1¯Xit¡1 + ®2¯Xit¡1 £ D + ®1° + ®2° £ D + ²it
²it = ®1(´t + ui + vit) + ®2(´t + ui + vit) £ D:
Book leverage is book debt divided by invested capital. Book debt is de¯ned as debt in current liabilities
(COMPUSTAT Annual Item 34) plus long-term debt (Item 9). Book equity is stockholders' equity (Item
216) plus minority interest (Item 38). Book debt plus book equity is de¯ned as invested capital. Market
leverage is the ratio of corresponding book debt to market value of assets (Item 25£Item 199 plus book
debt). Market-to-book ratio is de¯ned as book debt plus market equity divided by total assets. D is
represented by Size and Shelf, respectively, in the table. Size is a dummy variable that is 1 for large
¯rms and 0 for small ¯rms. Shelf is a dummy variable that is 1 for ¯rms with shelf registration and 0 for
¯rms without shelf registration. EBITDA=A is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item
13) divided by total assets. log(S) is logarithm of net sales (Item 12). PPE=A denotes net property,
plant and equipment (Item 8) divided by total assets. ´t is time series e®ects, ui captures individual
e®ects, and vit is disturbance. The estimates of the coe±cients on Xit¡1£D, constant and year dummies
are not reported. Absolute value of t-statistics are in bracket. m1 and m2 are tests for ¯rst-order and
second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). GMM results are one-step estimates. Sargan-
Hansen is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically Â2. P-values
are reported for m1, m2 and Sargan-Hansen test. Absolute value of t-statistics are in bracket. ¤¤ or ¤
indicate signi¯cance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Book Leverage Market Leverage
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Lt¡1 0.84** 0.88** 0.81** 0.85**
[29.32] [41.74] [34.89] [47.33]
Size £ Lt¡1 -0.01 - 0.05 -
[0.31] - [1.64] -
Shelf £ Lt¡1 - -0.09* - -0.04
- [2.45] - [1.25]
M=Bt¡1 0.53 -0.09 0.46 0.50
[1.33] [0.27] [1.20] [1.51]
EBITDA=At¡1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08* -0.07*
[0.67] [0.41] [2.43] [2.10]
log(S)t¡1 -0.61 -0.35 0.26 0.33
[1.16] [0.99] [0.51] [1.05]
PPE=At¡1 0.05* 0.08** 0.06* 0.09**
[1.97] [3.67] [2.16] [3.73]
N 8725 8725 8725 8725
m1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
m2 0.48 0.52 0.75 0.74
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Figure 1: Comparison of Book and Market Leverage Adjustment Patterns. Top: Capital
structure adjustment from 1 year before to 5 years after the signi¯cant change in leverage ratio. There
are 1342 ¯rms in the positive sample and 1745 ¯rms in the negative sample. Bottom: Capital structure
adjustment from 5 years before to 5 years after the the signi¯cant change in leverage ratio. There are
368 ¯rms in the positive sample and 572 ¯rms in the negative sample. L, ¡L and MKTL, ¡MKTL
are book and market leverage of ¯rms experiencing more than 20% increase and decrease in debt ratio,
respectively. Book leverage is book debt divided by invested capital. Book debt is de¯ned as debt in
current liabilities (Item 34) plus long-term debt (Item 9). Book equity is stockholders' equity (Item 216)
plus minority interest (Item 38). Book debt plus book equity is de¯ned as invested capital. Market









































Figure 2: Comparison of Industry Distribution. Positive and Negative give the industry distri-
butions for ¯rms in the positive and negative sample, respectively. The X-axis has two-digit SIC code
and the Y-axis has the percentage of ¯rms in each industry.
38Appendix A: De¯nitions of Variables
D(book debt) Debt in current liabilities (Item 34)+long-term debt (Item 9)
E(book equity) Shareholder's equity (Item 216)+minority interest (Item 38)
Market equity Common shares outstanding (Item 25)£share price (Item 199)
IC Invested capital=book debt+book equity
L Book leverage=book debt/(book debt+book equity)
M Market value of assets=book debt+market equity
MKTL Market leverage=book debt/market value of assets
M/B Market-to-book ratio=market value of assets/total assets (Item 6)
EBITDA/A Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item 13)/total assets
log(S) logarithm of net sales (Item 12)
PPE/A Net property, plant and equipment (Item 8)/total assets
R&D Research and development expenditure (Item 46,
replaced by zero if missing)
INV/PPE Capital expenditures (Item 128)/PPE
DIV/E Common dividends (Item 21)/book equity
CASH/A Cash and short-term investments (Item 1)/total assets
¢RE/A Change in retained earnings (Item 36)/total assets
TAX/S (Income tax (Item 16)-deferred tax (Item 50))/net sales
Z-score 3.3£EBIT (Item 170+Item 15)/total assets
+0:99£net sales (Item 12)/total assets
+0:6£market value of equity(Item25£Item 199)/total liabilities (Item 181)
+1:2£working capital (Item 179)/total assets
+1:4£retained earnings (Item 36)/total assets
d/A Net debt issues=change in book debt/total assets
e/A Net equity issues=(¢book equity-¢retained earnings)/total assets
RET Dividend and split-adjusted stock return=(Item 199+Item 26)/(Item 27)
divided by lag(Item 199)/lag(Item 27)
39Appendix B: the system GMM estimator
This appendix shows the moment conditions of the system Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) estimator for the partial adjustment model
Lit = (1 ¡ ®)Lit¡1 + ®¯Xit¡1 + ®° + ²it (B-1)
²it = ®(´t + ui + vit)
for i = 1;¢¢¢;N and t = 2;¢¢¢;T, where Lit is ¯rm i's leverage ratio at time t, Xit¡1 is a
vector of ¯rm characteristics that determine a ¯rm's leverage ratio, ´t is time series e®ects,
ui captures individual ¯rm e®ects, and vit is disturbance.
Since the explanatory variable Lit¡1 is correlated with the individual ¯rm e®ect ui in the
error term, we need to eliminate the individual ¯rm e®ect and ¯nd instrumental variables
that correlate with the explanatory variable Lit¡1, but not with the error term. The ¯rst-
di®erence transformation eliminates the individual ¯rm e®ect ui from equation (B-1)
¢Lit = (1 ¡ ®)¢Lit¡1 + ®¯¢Xit¡1 + ¢²it (B-2)
¢²it = ®(¢´t + ¢vit)
for i = 1;¢¢¢;N and t = 2;¢¢¢;T, where ¢Lit = Lit ¡Lit¡1. Though ¯rst-di®erencing elimi-
nates the individual ¯rm e®ects, it introduces correlation between the explanatory variables
and the error term. Therefore, OLS estimator for equation (B-2) is inconsistent since ¢vit,
as a component of the error term, includes vit¡1 that correlates with the explanatory variable
¢Lit¡1. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a di®erenced GMM estimator, which uses Lit¡2
and earlier lagged values as instruments for the transformed explanatory variable ¢Lit¡1
under the assumption of no serial correlation of the disturbance vit. For the ¯rst-di®erenced
40GMM estimator, with the assumption of predetermined ¯rm characteristic variables Xit¡1,
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and ¢²i is a vector (¢²i3;¢²i4;¢¢¢;¢²iT)0.
However, the lagged levels are often weak instruments for the ¯rst di®erence variables
when the series are highly persistent, because the correlation between ¢Lit¡1 and Lit¡2
drops as the coe±cient approaches 1. The di®erenced GMM estimator is therefore subject
to serious ¯nite sample biases and less precision in simulation studies. Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) develop a the system GMM estimator, which adds
the levels equations (instrumented using lagged ¯rst di®erences) to the di®erenced equations
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and ²i is a vector (¢²i;²i3;¢¢¢;¢²iT)0.
The consistency of the system GMM depends on the critical assumption of no serial
correlation in the disturbance vit, which can be tested by testing for negative ¯rst-order
correlation and zero second-order correlation in the ¯rst-di®erenced residuals (m1 and m2
tests). The validity of the instruments can be tested by the Sargan-Hansen test.
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